Publicação
IMF arrangements, politics and the timing of stabilizations
| Resumo: | This paper analyses the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrangements on the timing of inflation stabilization programs. Essentially, we test the hypothesis that IMF aid accelerates stabilization using probit and proportional hazards models. As in theoretical models, results are mixed: larger withdrawals of the amounts agreed to seem to hasten stabilization, but there is weak evidence that IMF arrangements lead to greater delays. Concerning other effects, greater fragmentation of the political system delays stabilization while higher inflation tends to hasten it. Other political and economic variables do not seem to have significant effects on the timing of stabilizations. |
|---|---|
| Autores principais: | Veiga, Francisco José |
| Assunto: | IMF Stabilization Timing Politics |
| Ano: | 1999 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | comunicação em conferência |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso aberto |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade do Minho |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho |
| Resumo: | This paper analyses the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrangements on the timing of inflation stabilization programs. Essentially, we test the hypothesis that IMF aid accelerates stabilization using probit and proportional hazards models. As in theoretical models, results are mixed: larger withdrawals of the amounts agreed to seem to hasten stabilization, but there is weak evidence that IMF arrangements lead to greater delays. Concerning other effects, greater fragmentation of the political system delays stabilization while higher inflation tends to hasten it. Other political and economic variables do not seem to have significant effects on the timing of stabilizations. |
|---|
Atividades financiadas
Não foram encontrados projetos financiados.