Publicação
Belief and Investigation in Plato’s Republic
| Resumo: | It is surprising that, traditionally, Plato scholars have been content with an interpretation of the Republic according to which Plato cannot allow for beliefs about the good. What we ideally come to know, the Form of the Good, is an intelligible object, not an object of belief (doxa). But how should we think of ethical investigation? From the point of view of contemporary ethics, and from the point of view of ordinary talk about our ethical lives, it seems obvious that we have beliefs about the good. Perhaps we would not say that we have beliefs about 'the' good, but rather, that we have beliefs about what is good, or beliefs about what it means to say that something is good. Starting from such beliefs, we might try to formulate a theoretical account of these matters. It would seem that an ethical theory according to which we cannot conduct this type of investigation must be misguided.1 We should not ascribe such a theory to Plato—the Republic itself is an ethical investigation that begins from beliefs about intelligible matters.2 Accordingly, Plato should be able to account for such beliefs, beliefs that figure in philosophical investigation. |
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| Autores principais: | Vogt, Katja Maria |
| Ano: | 2009 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Tipo de acesso: | unknown |
| Instituição associada: | Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Plato Journal |
| Resumo: | It is surprising that, traditionally, Plato scholars have been content with an interpretation of the Republic according to which Plato cannot allow for beliefs about the good. What we ideally come to know, the Form of the Good, is an intelligible object, not an object of belief (doxa). But how should we think of ethical investigation? From the point of view of contemporary ethics, and from the point of view of ordinary talk about our ethical lives, it seems obvious that we have beliefs about the good. Perhaps we would not say that we have beliefs about 'the' good, but rather, that we have beliefs about what is good, or beliefs about what it means to say that something is good. Starting from such beliefs, we might try to formulate a theoretical account of these matters. It would seem that an ethical theory according to which we cannot conduct this type of investigation must be misguided.1 We should not ascribe such a theory to Plato—the Republic itself is an ethical investigation that begins from beliefs about intelligible matters.2 Accordingly, Plato should be able to account for such beliefs, beliefs that figure in philosophical investigation. |
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