Este trabajo que tiene como título “El Proceso de Integración Regional en la Unión Europea: de la Ciudadanía Comunitária a las Perspectivas para el Mercado Común del Sur”, se analisará las iniciativas de integración regional de la Unión Europea (UE) y del Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) sobre las perspectivas de la institucionalización de los derechos de la ciudadanía. Teniendo como objetivo tomar como parámetro histórico a la Unión Europea – único modelo de integración regional supranacional com ciudadanía comunitária – y hacer um paralelo com el Mercado Comun del Sur, con el objetivo de averiguar las posibilidades de ampliación del processo mercosulino, identificando sus limitaciones políticas, jurídicas y sociales.

Planejar no espaço obriga a repartir, conceber, dividir, decidir e a agir. Repartir recursos, conceber polí­ticas, dividir o território, decidir de modo esclarecido e a agir com eficácia e eficiência. Este trabalho demonstra a riqueza da terminologia de espaço regional assim como, utilizando os exemplos de Portugal e do projeto comunitário europeu, verifica a múltipla complexidade dos processos de planejamento regional envolvidos, avançando com ritmos distintos e em função de determinantes, como a qualidade do financiamento ou das estruturas econômicas e polí­ticas, igualmente discutidas.

The study is oriented by two goals. First, it aims to measure the magnitude of the tariff used by the European Union on the agricultural products. Second, it tries to identify the existence of tariff discrimination among the groups of agricultural products in the European tariff set. The hypothesis is that there is tariff discrimination in the EU agricultural tariff schedule. Theoretical and empirical studies have already suggested that there are groups of products particularly protected by the EU agricultural tariffs. The present work has one main contribution: the discussion related to the effects of using different prices to the conversion of EU specific and composed tariffs. The study points to certain sets of agricultural products targeted by the EU trade policy: especially meat, sugar, residues and waste from food industries; and, at second, tobacco, meat preparations, cereals, cocoa and preparations, cereal preparations, dairy products, and organic quimical products.

The objective of this paper is to present a game theory analysis of the incentives a state member of the European Union may have to disrespect the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), thus keeping an excessive deficit, in spite of the political and financial risks associated with the non-compliance. Several games are analyzed: complete and incomplete information between a country and the European Union and incomplete information between the Union and two countries. This last case brings about an equilibrium that involves reputation building. The main conclusion is that the European Union must be strong and enforce the pact’s sanctions, even if that imposes a high political cost. Indeed, if the European Union lacks the determination to compel the members to adjust their deficits, one may expect a general non-compliance of the SGP, which will lead to a fiscal collapse of the Economic and Monetary Union.